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It’s Whose Party? Accurately Defining Political 
Parties in First Amendment Cases 
An association for political [purposes] . . . is a powerful and 
enlightened member of the community, which cannot be disposed 
of at pleasure or oppressed without remonstrance, and which, by 
defending its own rights against the encroachments of the 
government, saves the common liberties of the country.1 
—Alexis de Tocqueville 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment demands exacting scrutiny of laws that 
severely burden political parties—but accurately measuring the 
severity of that burden requires first accurately defining the 
political party itself. For without accurately defining the bearer of a 
burden, a court cannot adequately measure the severity of that 
burden. Indeed, as a split Tenth Circuit panel recently 
demonstrated, to define a party is to determine the outcome: By 
defining the Utah Republican Party (the “Party”) as “like-minded 
individuals,” the majority found no burden on the Party’s 
associational freedoms.2 In contrast, by defining the Party as an 
organization “distinct from . . . the individuals that form its 
membership,” the dissent found severe burdens on the Party’s 
associational freedoms.3 This definitional dispute is not unique to 
the Tenth Circuit. Despite historical prevalence of cases involving 
political parties, there is no clear articulation of how to legally 
define these groups.4 Some courts define a party by its members, 
measuring a law’s burden on each individual member’s 
associational freedoms;5 some define a party by its institutional 
 
 2. Utah Republican Party v. Cox, 885 F.3d 1219, 1232–33 (10th Cir. 2018) (emphasis 
added), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1290. By way of general disclaimer, I also worked extensively 
on that petition for the Utah Republican Party. 
 3. Id. at 1256 (Tymkovich, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 4. See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of Political Parties: A 
Reassessment of Competing Paradigms, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 775 (2000) (“Despite the 
increasing number of cases involving political parties that have occupied court dockets in 
the last half-century, judges have been unable to develop a coherent or consistent theoretical 
framework for defining the legal relationship between political parties, the state, and the 
individual.”); Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties, 
Associational Freedoms, and Partisan Competition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274, 279 (2001) (stating 
that throughout the caselaw there is persistent “legal uncertainty about what the party 
actually is”); Elizabeth Garrett, Is the Party Over? Courts and the Political Process, 2002 SUP. CT. 
REV. 95, 95 (noting how the judiciary has “failed to develop sophisticated positive and 
normative views of political parties, resulting in a jurisprudence of the political process that 
is inconsistent and unsatisfying”). 
 5. E.g., Utah Republican Party, 885 F.3d at 1232–33 (measuring a law’s burden on party 
members); see also Alaskan Indep. Party v. Alaska, 545 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2008) (same); 
Swamp v. Kennedy, 950 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); Geary v. Renne, 880 F.2d 1062 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (same). 
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organization, customs, bylaws, or leadership;6 and some approach 
the task more holistically, defining parties by some combination of 
membership, leadership, and structure.7 At worst, courts simply 
refer to such plaintiffs as “the party,”8 grossly simplifying what 
both legal scholars and political scientists agree is an entity with 
many distinct components.9 
No doubt, clarifying the muddy line10 between permissible and 
impermissible burdens on political party associational freedoms 
would be a laudable endeavor—perhaps especially as political 
parties are fundamental to our democratic system.11 But before 
clarifying that line, we must first accurately define the parties 
themselves. To measure a law’s burden, a court must know the 
“who”—who actually bears a burden, or on whom should that 
burden be measured. Accurately defining the party thus gives courts 
this crucial “who,” ensuring that they do not improperly define 
political parties as the Tenth Circuit did in Utah Republican Party. 
 
 6. E.g., Utah Republican Party, 885 F.3d at 1256 (Tymkovich, C.J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part); see also Green Party of Ark. v. Martin, 649 F.3d 675, 682 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(finding no burden because regulation “does not regulate the [Green Party]’s internal 
processes, its authority to exclude unwanted members, or its capacity to communicate with 
the public”) (emphasis added) (quoting Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 583 (2005)). 
 7. E.g., Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Blackwell, 462 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(looking at “the effect of the regulations on the voters, the parties and the candidates; 
evidence of the real impact the restriction has on the process; and the interests of the state 
relative to the scope of the election”). 
 8. E.g., Martin, 649 F.3d at 683 (finding that an Arkansas statute did not “severely 
infringe[] the Green Party’s association rights,” without specifically defining the party). 
 9. See, e.g., V. O. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, & PRESSURE GROUPS 164–65 (5th ed. 1964) 
(identifying the three component parts of a party: party-organization, party-in-government, 
and party-electorate); see also Persily & Cain, supra note 4, at 778 (identifying V. O. Key’s 
three components as a “foundational work of political science”); Lauren Hancock, Note, The 
Life of the Party: Analyzing Political Parties’ First Amendment Associational Rights when the 
Primary Election Process is Construed Along a Continuum, 88 MINN. L. REV. 159, 166–68 (2003) 
(same). This trichotomy is also discussed below in section IV.B. 
 10. Cf. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 359 (1997) (“No bright 
line separates permissible election-related regulation from unconstitutional infringements 
on First Amendment freedoms.”) (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)). 
 11. 2 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1; see also Michael R. Dimino, Sr., It’s My Party and 
I’ll Do What I Want to: Political Parties, Unconstitutional Conditions, and the Freedom of 
Association, 12 FIRST. AMEND. L. REV. 65, 75 (2013) (“[T]he First Amendment’s protections of 
associational autonomy should apply with ‘special force’ to political parties, whose very 
existence is dedicated to the collective expression and propagation of shared [political] 
ideals.” (quoting Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 
200 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (Alito, J., concurring) (alteration in original))). 
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Like most legal scholarship, however, the answer is “it 
depends.” In defining the “party,” factors like the plaintiff’s 
characteristics, the election stage being regulated, and the 
individual or entity acting on behalf of the party all inform how a 
political party is accurately defined. Using these factors and pulling 
from legal and interdisciplinary literature on political parties and 
expanding that scholarship a bit further, this Note introduces the 
Plaintiff-Stage framework—a systematic and objective approach  
to accurately defining political parties at various stages of the 
election process. 
Parts II and III provide context by summarizing both Utah 
Republican Party v. Cox and the Anderson-Burdick test, a framework 
used to determine an election law’s constitutionality. Part IV 
describes the first iteration of the Plaintiff-Stage framework by 
schematizing existing scholarship and case law. But because this 
version of the framework does not quite address the effect of laws 
like Utah’s SB54, Part V addresses and remedies these deficiencies, 
ultimately providing a completed iteration of this framework. Part 
VI then briefly responds to normative (and often subjective) 
considerations that judges may use in deciding these cases. At least 
as applied to the recent Utah Republican Party case, the Plaintiff-
Stage framework would have diametrically altered the Tenth 
Circuit’s conclusions. In a broader sense, the Plaintiff-Stage 
framework offers judges an objective and systematic method of 
accurately defining political parties in order to then accurately 
measure burdens on associational rights. 
II. UTAH REPUBLICAN PARTY V. COX 
The Utah Republican Party has a specific way in which it 
nominates candidates for state primary elections. Delegates are 
selected in neighborhood caucuses to represent their respective 
neighborhoods, and those delegates convene in the Party’s state 
convention to nominate candidates to the primary ballot.12 In 2014, 
the Utah Legislature enacted Senate Bill 54 (SB54), altering how 
candidate names are placed on the ballot. Under SB54, political 
parties like the Utah Republican Party could still place candidates 
on its primary ballot through its caucus meetings and convention, 
 
 12. See Utah Republican Party v. Cox, 885 F.3d 1219, 1224 (10th Cir. 2018). 
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but it could not limit primary candidates to this exclusive method 
of nomination. Instead, “a candidate who is unwilling or unable to 
gain placement on the primary ballot through the caucus and 
convention [could] still qualify for the primary by gathering a set 
number of signatures by petition from eligible primary voters.”13 In 
this way, SB54 allows candidates to seek nomination by “either or 
both of the following methods:” adhere to the “political party’s 
convention process” or “by collecting signatures.”14 Colloquially, 
this became known as the “Either or Both Provision.” 
After an initial lawsuit in which the district court excised a 
different provision of SB54 on constitutional grounds,15 the Utah 
Republican Party asked the court to rule that the Either or Both 
Provision was also unconstitutional.16 The Party alleged that 
because SB54 allowed candidates to circumvent the Party’s self-
selected method of choosing its own standard-bearers, SB54 could 
impermissibly alter the Party’s message, violating its associational 
rights. The district court rejected this argument, holding that the 
Either or Both Provision did not infringe upon the Party’s right of 
association.17 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, supporting its analysis by 
two determinations that, as described in Parts IV and V below, are 
critical in defining “the party”: determining which stage of the 
election is affected by SB54 and how a party is defined at that stage. 
Determining the stage affected, the court held that SB54 did not 
target the nomination or endorsement stages—internal processes 
that states usually cannot regulate. Instead, the court found SB54 to 
affect the Party’s external processes, or the primary election itself.18 
 
 13. Id. at 1225. “Eligible primary voters” are only those voters who belong to the specific 
party participating in a primary as the court found in an earlier case. See infra note 15. 
 14. Id. (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-9-101(12)(c) (West 2019)). 
 15. See generally Utah Republican Party v. Herbert, 144 F. Supp. 3d 1263, 1278 (D. Utah 
2015) (excising the Unaffiliated Voter Provision, which allowed the signature requirement to 
be met by gathering signatures from any Utah voter rather than from members of the parties 
themselves, because it imposed severe burdens on the Utah Republican Party’s  
First Amendment rights and because the state had no compelling interests supporting  
the provision). 
 16. Utah Republican Party, 885 F.3d at 1226. 
 17. Utah Republican Party v. Cox, 178 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 1179 (D. Utah 2016). 
 18. Utah Republican Party, 885 F.3d at 1229 (noting SB54 targets the “method by which 
[the Party] selects its nominee to appear on the general election ballot for state and federal offices”) 
(emphasis added); see also id. at 1230 (“[O]ur consideration . . . extends only insomuch as  
they indicate that a party’s external activities in selecting candidates for public office  
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Then, defining “the party” at the primary stage, the court stated that 
the “Utah Republican Party” only consisted of Republican voters.19 
These determinations proved dispositive in the Tenth Circuit’s 
analysis. By categorizing SB54 as only affecting the primary stage, 
it was logical to only measure SB54’s burden on those directly 
involved in the primary, that is, party members in the electorate. 
And because SB54 “ensure[d] that all party members have some 
voice in deciding who their party’s representative will be,” SB54 
would ensure “the will of all the [Party]” was expressed.20 
Categorized in this way, SB54 did not burden the Party vis-à-vis its 
members from choosing its standard bearer.21 Moreover, in defining 
the Party as its members, it was irrelevant whether the law burdened 
other components of the Party like its leadership, who may have 
disagreed with the nomination of a candidate.22 Thus, the court held 
that “the Either or Both Provision is at most only a minimal burden 
on the [Party’s] First Amendment associational rights.”23 
Had the panel defined the stage affected or “the party” 
differently, the court would have reached a drastically different 
conclusion. For example, the dissent found that SB54 actually 
impacted the nomination stage as it “change[d] the substantive 
type of candidates the Party nominates” by changing the Party’s 
nominating procedure.24 As the dissent continued, “[t]he problem 
[with SB54] is that the Party cannot use the caucus system as its 
exclusive means of nomination while still being able to list its 
endorsements on the ballot.”25 Put in other words, the Party could 
not determine the candidates it would endorse through its self-
selected procedures. Instead, candidates without the Party’s 
institutional endorsement (via the caucus system) would be 
 
must necessarily be subject to greater state involvement and scrutiny than its wholly  
internal machinations.”). 
 19. Id. at 1232–33. 
 20. Id. at 1232 (emphasis added in second quotation). 
 21. Id. at 1232–33. Contra Calif. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) 
(invalidating California’s mandated blanket primary in which voters, regardless of 
affiliation, could vote for a party’s candidates in the primaries). 
 22. Utah Republican Party, 885 F.3d at 1235. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 1246, 1255 (Tymkovich, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(emphasis in original omitted). 
 25. Id. at 1255 (emphasis added). 
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representing the Party on the Party’s own primary ballot and 
possibly (if the candidate succeeded) in the general election.  
This categorization heavily influenced how the dissent defined 
“the party”: “A political party is more than the sum of its 
members . . . . Parties therefore have associational rights that are 
distinct from those of the individuals that form its membership. The 
superstructure of the party—its bylaws, customs, and leadership—
are protected by the First Amendment too.”26 
These two alternative determinations—that SB54 affected the 
nomination stage and that the party was defined by its “bylaws, 
customs, and leadership”—led to a conclusion diametrically 
opposed to the majority’s: Because SB54 grants candidates 
authority to circumvent the Party’s self-designated nomination 
procedures, the law would clearly impose a severe burden on the 
Party vis-à-vis the burden placed on the Party’s internal structures 
and procedures.27 
I have already noted the dissenting judge was most likely correct 
in his analysis, but to understand this conclusion it is important to 
first understand what framework the Tenth Circuit should have 
used. Accordingly, this Note continues with a brief discussion of the 
Anderson-Burdick test—the relevant test for measuring burdens on 
political parties—followed by an evaluation of existing scholarship 
used to define “the party.” This scholarship falls short in 
determining both the stage affected and how to define the “party.” 
As neither courts nor scholars have squarely addressed this 
question, the remainder of this Note is dedicated to that discussion. 
In sum, for situations similar to SB54 and the Utah Republican Party 
where the regulation affects the nomination process itself, “the 
party” is best defined, as the dissent suggested, by the “bylaws” and 
“customs” of a party.28 And it is the burden on those bylaws and 
customs, i.e., the party as an institution, that should have informed 
the Tenth Circuit’s Anderson-Burdick analysis. 
 
 26. Id. at 1256. 
 27. Id. at 1257–58. 
 28. See id. at 1256. 
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III. THE ANDERSON-BURDICK TEST 
The Constitution grants Congress the right to prescribe “[t]he 
Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives.”29 The U.S. Supreme Court has also held that 
states enjoy a similar right in regulating their own elections because 
“as a practical matter, there must be some substantial regulation of 
elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some order, rather 
than chaos, is to accompany the democratic process.”30 Competing 
against this state interest, however, is the fundamental and 
constitutional significance of a free election process.31 Thus, courts 
“take great care to scrutinize any electoral regulation” that would 
burden this process.32 Courts use the Anderson-Burdick test to 
perform such scrutiny. 
This test does not restrict every burden, however, as even the 
smallest regulation impacts the election process in some way. 
Instead, the Anderson-Burdick test scrutinizes only those regulations 
that impose unconstitutionally severe burdens.33 In Anderson v. 
Celebrezze,34 later clarified by Burdick v. Takushi,35 the U.S. Supreme 
Court explained the relationship between burden severity and 
unconstitutionality in the following balancing test: 
 
 29. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 30. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974); Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 
520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997) (“[I]t is also clear that States may, and inevitably must, enact 
reasonable regulations of parties, elections, and ballots to reduce election- and campaign-
related disorder.”); see also Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986) 
(reaffirming the states’ interests to regulate their own elections). 
 31. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (noting that the election process is of 
“most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 32. Utah Republican Party, 885 F.3d at 1228. 
 33. See, e.g., id. (“For example, even a state’s decision to close its polls at 7:00 PM 
instead of 8:00 PM will invariably burden some voters—and therefore their respective 
parties—for whom the earlier time is inconvenient; so too, however, if the state chose 8:00 
PM instead of 9:00 PM. These burdens, then must necessarily accommodate a state’s 
legitimate interest in providing order, stability, and legitimacy to the electoral process.”). 
 34. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 782–89 (1983) (striking down an early filing 
deadline in Ohio, reiterating that no litmus-paper test existed for defining acceptable and 
unacceptable burdens on voting and association given that substantial regulation of the 
electoral process is necessary). 
 35. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 428 (upholding Hawaii’s write-in voting ban and clarifying 
that when the burden is severe, strict scrutiny applies, but when the law imposes only 
“reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” then state interests are usually sufficient). 
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[A] court considering a challenge to a state election law must 
weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the 
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the 
plaintiff seeks to vindicate” against the “precise interests put 
forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by 
its rule,” taking into consideration “the extent to which those 
interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.”36 
In other words, if a court finds that a law imposes “severe 
burdens on [a party’s] associational rights,” the court engages in a 
strict scrutiny analysis.37 Contrastingly, if the law imposes “lesser 
burdens, a State’s important regulatory interests will usually be 
enough to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.”38 As 
two legal scholars have put it, this test can be simplified to four key 
questions: First, “whose rights were violated?” or rather, who is 
“the plaintiff”? Second, “[h]ow severe is the deprivation of the 
[plaintiff’s] rights?” Third, what are the state interests justifying the 
burden? And fourth, depending on whether the burden was severe 
or reasonable, are the state interests “sufficiently weighty to justify 
the restraint on the [plaintiff’s] rights?”39 
Despite the “simple mechanics” of this test, “unforeseeable 
results” follow.40 For example and most relevant to this Note, how 
does a court define “the plaintiff” in order to define the plaintiff’s 
rights? As demonstrated both in the previous section and the 
sections that follow, when “the party” is the plaintiff, the Anderson-
Burdick test provides no guidance on how that plaintiff should be 
defined.41 The following analysis is thus focused on this 
ambiguity—how a court defines the plaintiff and its asserted rights 
when that plaintiff is a political party. And while this Note does not 
discuss the severity of burdens or the justification of state interests, 
at least in Utah Republican Party the court made clear that if SB54 
 
 36. Id. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789) (emphasis added). 
 37. Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 586 (2005) (quoting Timmons v. Twin Cities Area 
New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 38. Id. at 586–87 (quoting Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 39. Persily & Cain, supra note 4, at 776–77. 
 40. Id. at 777; see also supra note 4 and accompanying sources. 
 41. See DANIEL P. TOKAJI, ELECTION LAW IN A NUTSHELL 265 (2013) (explaining how 
both Anderson and Burdick were analyzed around facts dealing with ballot access, not  
party rights). 
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had severely burdened the Party, the State of Utah had weak 
interests justifying such a burden.42 
IV. DEFINING “THE PARTY” 
Unfortunately, no scholar or court seems to have squarely 
addressed how political parties are to be defined in First 
Amendment cases. But the current literature and court cases do 
provide much to be gleaned. Accordingly, this Part draws upon 
and schematizes these sources to create the Plaintiff-Stage 
framework. This Part provides only a preliminary iteration, 
however, as there are deficiencies that the Plaintiff-Stage 
framework 1.0 does not address. That said, I address these 
deficiencies and supplement the framework in Part V. In both this 
part and the next, I have relied on three key questions to develop 
this framework: (1) Who is the plaintiff? (2) What component of the 
party is suing? And (3) what stage of the election process does the 
state regulation affect? As I discuss below, these ultimately stem 
from the broader Anderson-Burdick test itself. 
A. Who is “the Plaintiff”? 
Properly defining parties in these cases first begins with 
determining who the plaintiff really is and what rights the plaintiff 
is asserting.43 In fact, properly identifying “the plaintiff” begins to 
harmonize the “incompatible” election law jurisprudence that 
scholars have categorized as an “ad hoc approach . . . produc[ing] 
contradictory results via incompatible methodologies.”44 For 
example, when voters allege that an election law burdens their 
 
 42. Utah Republican Party v. Cox, 885 F.3d 1219, 1229 (10th Cir. 2018) (“The distinction 
between wholly internal aspects of party administration on one hand and participation in 
state-run, state-financed elections on the other is at the heart of this case. When a party selects 
its platform, its Chairman, or even whom it will endorse in the upcoming election, the state 
generally has no more interest in these internal activities than in the administration of the 
local Elks lodge or bar association. But when the party’s actions turn outwards to the actual 
nomination and election of an individual who will swear an oath not to protect the Party, 
but instead the Constitution, and when the individual ultimately elected has the 
responsibility to represent all the residents in his or her district, the state acquires a manifest 
interest in that activity, and the party’s interest in such activity must share the stage with the 
state’s manifest interest.”). 
 43. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 
460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)). 
 44. Dimino, supra note 11, at 66. 
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associational rights as voters, it is intuitive that a court focus on 
how the law burdens voters themselves.45 Similarly, when 
candidates challenge their ability to access the ballot due to 
burdensome signature requirements, courts analyze a law’s 
burdens on that individual.46 The same intuition should follow 
when a political party brings suit: a court should analyze burdens 
on the party’s associational rights. 
Simply looking at each side of the “v.,” however, is not always 
instructive. For example, when some conglomeration of parties, 
candidates, and voters are suing, determining the right-bearing 
plaintiff can be more challenging. Under the Anderson-Burdick test, 
a court is not only to identify the plaintiff, but, more generally, “the 
character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights 
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the 
plaintiff seeks to vindicate.”47 Thus the “asserted injury” and the 
“rights” alleged can also help a court determine who truly is “the 
plaintiff.” For example, in Lightfoot v. Eu, write-in candidates and a 
party itself sued the State of California for its law requiring political 
parties to nominate candidates by direct primary and requiring 
candidates to demonstrate some support before appearing on the 
general ballot.48 Because both the individual candidates and the 
party each asserted their own associational rights, the court 
separately analyzed the California law’s burden on both the 
 
 45. E.g., Voting for Am., Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2013) (explaining that a 
voting organization brought suit against a law affecting voter rights; burden on voters 
analyzed); Werme v. Merrill, 84 F.3d 479 (1st Cir. 1996) (analyzing the burden of a law 
impacting voter rights; voting organization brought suit). 
 46. E.g., Marcellus v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 849 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2017) (analyzing 
the candidate’s First Amendment rights); Kucinich v. Tex. Democratic Party, 563 F.3d 161 
(5th Cir. 2009) (same); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(analyzing the burdens on individual judges when a state law forbade judges from speaking 
out on political topics); LaRouche v. Fowler, 152 F.3d 974 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (analyzing a 
candidate’s First Amendment rights against state interests); Duke v. Cleland, 954 F.2d 1526 
(11th Cir. 1992) (analyzing individual candidate’s First Amendment associational rights); 
Fletcher v. Marino, 882 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1989) (same). Note that some of these cases also 
measure burdens on the voters themselves because what is really at issue is a voter’s ability 
to associate with a candidate. See, e.g., Rosen v. Brown, 970 F.2d 169 (6th Cir. 1992) (analyzing 
the burden on voters of a state regulation removing “Independent” from a non-affiliated 
candidate’s name on the ballot). 
 47. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (emphasis added) (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789). 
 48. Lightfoot v. Eu, 964 F.2d 865, 865 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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individual candidates and the party.49 Contrastingly, in Price v. New 
York State Board of Elections, a candidate, voters, and a party all 
brought suit challenging New York’s absentee ballot restrictions, 
but the court focused exclusively on the burden on voters’ rights: 
because the ballot restrictions primarily impacted voters 
themselves, the primary “rights” affected and the “asserted injury” 
were voters’ rights, making voters themselves the focus.50 
Thus, when the core “rights” or “asserted injury” involve party 
associational rights like in Lightfoot, a court should then measure 
the law’s burdens on the political party itself as “the plaintiff” 
under the Anderson-Burdick framework. And it goes without saying 
that in cases where the party alone is bringing suit for its own First 
Amendment associational rights, like in Utah Republican Party,51 a 
court should focus on ways in which it can define and measure the 
burden on that political party. 
B. What Component of “the Party” Is Suing? 
But even in cases where a political party itself brings suit, 
asserting its own rights, a court must still define “the party.” A 
party is not the unitary entity that courts often consider it to be. As 
the dissent in Utah Republican Party aptly noted,  
[w]hile only party members can vote in the party’s primary, not 
all members are the same. . . . [T]he act of formal enrollment or 
public affiliation with the Party is merely one element in the 
continuum of participation in Party affairs, and need not be in any 
sense the most important.52  
Indeed, some courts have correctly recognized that “the party” is 
not a unitary organism. For example, in Eu v. San Francisco City 
 
 49. Id. at 873 (ruling that requiring “write-in candidates [to] demonstrate a modicum 
of support” before gaining access to the general election ballot did not violate the individual 
candidate’s associational rights; and ruling that requiring parties to nominate candidates  
by direct primary rather than by convention did not violate the associational rights of  
political parties). 
 50. Price v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 540 F.3d 101, 109–10 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 51. Utah Republican Party v. Cox, 885 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2018); see also, e.g., Cal. 
Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (asserting First Amendment rights as a political 
party); Republican Party of Ark. v. Faulkner Cty., 49 F.3d 1289 (8th Cir. 1995) (same). 
 52. Utah Republican Party, 885 F.3d at 1254 (Tymkovich, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 215 (1986) (internal quotation  
marks omitted)). 
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Democratic Central Committee,53 the U.S. Supreme Court noted that 
the challenged regulation in that case “directly implicate[d] the 
associational rights of political parties and their members.”54 
Similarly in Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,55 the Court 
evaluated “the burden cast by the statute upon the associational 
rights of the Party and its members.”56 
Consonantly, political scientists agree that parties are made up 
of different constituent parts. In the most common breakdown of 
political parties, political scientist V. O. Key identified three 
components of modern-day political parties: party members 
currently serving in elected government office (“party-
government”), lay party members comprising a portion of the 
electorate (“party-electorate”), and professional party workers, 
including party leadership (“party-organization”).57 Several legal 
scholars have also adopted this tripartite and have used it to further 
synthesize and simplify our election law jurisprudence.58 But if 
nothing else, to reference a political group as only “the party” is a 
gross overgeneralization. 
Determining which component of a party is suing (and thus 
defining “the party” in a suit), however, proves no easy feat. This 
is especially true when the party is fractured or the interests of the 
party-government, party-electorate, and party-organization diverge. 
In Utah Republican Party, for example, the Utah Republican Party as 
an organization was suing, and clearly the Utah Republican Party 
organization did not agree with the effect of SB54. However, on the 
 
 53. Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989). 
 54. Id. at 229 (emphasis added). 
 55. Tashjian, 479 U.S. 208. 
 56. Id. at 217 (emphasis added); see also Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 
581 (2000) (“the ability of the party leadership to endorse a candidate does not assist the party 
rank and file, who may not themselves agree with the party leadership, but do not want the 
party’s choice decided by outsiders”); Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 
363 (1997) (the law in question did not “restrict the ability of the New Party and its members 
to endorse . . . ”). 
 57. KEY, supra note 9. 
 58. E.g., Gur Bligh, Extremism in the Electoral Arena: Challenging the Myth of American 
Exceptionalism, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1367, 1430 n.312 (2008) (highlighting Key’s tripartite 
classification of political parties); Nathaniel Persily, Candidates v. Parties: The Constitutional 
Constraints on Primary Ballot Access Laws, 89 GEO. L.J. 2181, 2185–86 (2001) (accepting Key’s 
three components as the “tripartite classification” of the party); Persily & Cain, supra note 4, 
at 778 (identifying V. O. Key’s three components as a “foundational work of political 
science”); Nancy L. Rosenblum, Political Parties As Membership Groups, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
813, 818 (2000) (same); Hancock, supra note 9 (same). 
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other side of the “v.”, the party-government (at least in the Tenth 
Circuit majority’s view) had passed SB54, and the party-electorate 
were likely supportive as SB54 still allowed them to choose their 
preferred candidate.59 Utah Republican Party is no anomaly—often 
some component of the party appears on both sides of the litigation.60 
To solve this issue, courts could look to who is authorized to 
sue on behalf of the party at large: “the courts that often side with 
the party organization conclude that the party ‘speaks’ and ‘sues’ 
through its official body . . . .”61 But as a party’s lay members will 
rarely sue (or have the capacity to sue) as the official party, this 
conclusion would lead to a court defining a party only by its 
leadership in every situation. This singular approach poses its own 
challenges as this would contradict the accepted policy allowing 
state election regulations to “set their faces against party bosses” 
and protect the party-electorate.62 Thus, looking only to who is 
acting on behalf of the party is insufficient. 
 
 59. Utah Republican Party v. Cox, 885 F.3d 1219, 1224 (10th Cir. 2018) (noting that “the 
Utah Legislature—comprised of overwhelming Republican majorities in both the State 
House and State Senate—passed SB54”). Additionally, the Tenth Circuit noted that SB54 was 
enacted “only to ensure that all the party members have some voice in deciding who their 
party’s representative will be in the general election. SB54’s goal was to ensure only that the 
will of all the URP was not being truncated by an overly restrictive and potentially 
unrepresentative nominating process.” Id. at 1232. 
 60. See Persily, supra note 58, at 2185 (“In almost any case involving a political party, 
members of the party will be on both sides of the lawsuit. [Election law] issue[s] arise[] when 
a party organization challenges a state law that was passed either by the majority of the 
party’s voters in an initiative [party-electorate] or with the consent of the [party-government].”). 
 61. Id. at 2186 (emphasis added). 
 62. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 205 (2008) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Professor Persily also critiques this default definition of “the 
party” as the party-organization by pointing out the paternalistic results it yields: 
In the context of a primary ballot access lawsuit, the court must determine the 
constitutional limits on the power of the party organization and the party-in-the-
legislature to limit the choices available to the party-in-the-electorate. At the stage 
of preprimary litigation, no one knows whether the bulk of the membership of the 
party wants the names of additional candidates to appear on the primary ballot. 
Indeed, the precise question in the litigation is whether party members will even 
have the opportunity to express their candidate preferences. Thus, in the litigation, 
the party organization effectively takes the position of arguing that “the party” has 
a First Amendment right to prevent itself from expressing its preferences for 
particular candidates. Of course, the paternalism inherent in this position is 
obvious: The party organization is trying to protect the party-in-the-electorate 
from itself. 
Persily, supra note 58, at 2186; see also Utah Republican Party, 885 F.3d. at 1231 (quoting “party 
bosses” language in Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. at 205). 
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But despite the difficulty of this inquiry, a court must at least 
attempt to identify which component of “the party” is bringing suit. 
Thankfully, there are still two other considerations that will help a 
court determine which component of “the party” is being 
burdened: the stage affected and which component of a party 
exercises the party’s associational rights at that stage. 
C. What Stage of the Nominating Process Does the Law Affect? 
Because election regulations usually impact a specific portion 
of the election process, identifying that affected stage greatly 
enhances our understanding of how to accurately define “the 
party.” At different stages along the nomination process, “different 
components of the party have different degrees of power and 
different rights at stake.”63 And, as the Anderson-Burdick inquiry 
focuses not only on “the plaintiff” but also on “the rights . . . that  
the plaintiff seeks to vindicate,”64 understanding the rights of the 
party-government, party-electorate, and party-organization relative 
to each other at each stage of the nomination process can only 
further clarify how courts can accurately define “the party” in any 
given litigation. 
There are four basic stages of the nomination process: ballot 
access, endorsement procedures, party conventions, and the 
primary itself.65 In the ballot access stage, parties attempt to be 
recognized with their candidates on the primary ballot, and cases 
involving ballot access often concern the rules determining which 
parties and candidates can be placed on the ballot.”66At this stage, 
the party-electorate are minimally involved and “likely [do] not 
even know who the possible candidates are.”67 Accordingly,  
the party and its rights at this stage are best protected by  
 
 63. See generally Hancock, supra note 9. 
 64. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (emphasis added) (quoting Anderson 
v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)). 
 65. Hancock, supra note 9, at 169. 
 66. See id. at 170, 180. The most frequent type of case is when a candidate or party is 
unable to access a general election ballot and therefore sues. See generally, e.g., Timmons v. 
Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (New Party brought suit when it was unable 
to place its party name next to a candidate on the general election ballot); S.C. Green Party 
v. S.C. State Election Comm’n, 612 F.3d 752 (4th Cir. 2010) (candidate challenged the state 
statute preventing him from accessing the general election ballot via another party when he 
had already lost in the Democratic primary). 
 67. Hancock, supra note 9, at 181. 
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balancing the “rights of the organization to run the candidate of its 
choosing and the rights of the government to preserve a stable  
electoral process.”68 
 At the endorsement stage, parties use their “financing, 
organization, and personnel” to endorse candidates and send “a 
cue to loyal party voters, effectively garnering those votes.”69 At 
issue in endorsement cases is usually a party’s ability to endorse 
candidates of its choice.70 During the party convention stage (which 
tends to overlap with the endorsement stage), the party uses a 
convention to select candidates for the primary ballot, endorse 
candidates in the primary, or choose which candidates will run in 
the general election, forgoing the primary completely.71 Issues in 
convention stage cases often involve infringements on how parties 
structure their conventions.72 In both the endorsement and 
convention stages, “candidate selection through voting is never at 
issue, thereby minimizing the role of the [party-]electorate.”73 
Accordingly, both stages are “viewed as the province of the 
organization” rather than the party-electorate or party-government.74  
At least at the endorsement stage, the U.S. Supreme Court in  
Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee implicitly 
affirmed this conclusion, defining “the party” by party-
organization: A law banning a party from endorsing candidates in 
the primaries “prevent[ed] party governing bodies from stating 
 
 68. Id. (emphasis added). Note also that at the ballot access stage, Hancock ultimately 
concludes that courts should give the most deference to the party-government. While at first 
this seems contradictory to my explanation of Hancock’s conclusions, there is in fact no 
contradiction. Hancock states that when balancing between the party-government and party-
organization, the party-government has more of an interest than the party-organization. See 
id. at 180–82. In other words, after a court has already defined “the party” as the party-
organization, it must balance those interests against the government interests under the 
traditional Anderson-Burdick framework. See id. Because, however, this Note’s analysis 
focuses exclusively on how a court defines “the party” on the plaintiff side of the “v.” and 
not the ultimate balancing inquiry, I have not included her ultimate conclusion of how a 
court would rule in ballot access cases. 
 69. Id. at 171. 
 70. See generally, e.g., Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989) 
(California law proscribed party governing bodies from endorsing candidates at the  
primary stage). 
 71. Hancock, supra note 9, at 172. 
 72. E.g., Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981) 
(striking down Wisconsin law binding party delegates to vote in a certain way, dissonant 
with national party self-selected rules). 
 73. Hancock, supra note 9, at 182 (emphasis added) (emphasis omitted). 
 74. See id. (emphasis added). 
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whether a candidate adheres to the tenets of the party or whether 
party officials believe that the candidate is qualified for the  
position sought.”75  
As to the convention stage, scholars agree that the stage is also 
clearly “considered the province of the organization” as it is a time 
“where party members . . . meet to discuss the most effective means 
of furthering the organization’s goals.”76 Supporting this conclusion, 
Professor Nathaniel Persily concluded: 
The party convention represents the purest expression of the 
“party as organization”: It creates the party’s platform, it brings 
together partisans from all levels of government . . . . What a party 
means and stands for are determined at a convention. The right to 
determine representation at the convention, just like the right to 
determine who can lead a Boy Scout troop or march in a Saint 
Patrick’s Day parade, will determine the party’s message. . . . For 
the week that [delegates] convene, they engage in pure acts of 
speech and association.77 
The final stage in the nomination process is the primary election 
itself. Often at issue in primary election cases is who can actually 
vote in the primary.78 In contrast to the previous three stages, the 
very nature of this stage suggests that “the party” in these cases 
should be defined by the party-electorate: party members, not 
leaders in the organization or those in government, vote to select 
candidate(s) that move on to the general election.79 And, notably, 
the basic “purpose of nominating by primary elections is to enable 
voters, rather than a party organization or leaders, to choose  
the nominee.”80 Accordingly, defining “the party” by its members 
 
 75. Eu, 489 U.S. at 223 (emphasis added). 
 76. Hancock, supra note 9, at 183 (emphasis added). 
 77. Persily, supra note 58, at 2218 (footnotes omitted). 
 78. See generally, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (invalidating 
California law opening up party primaries to those not members of a given party); Tashjian 
v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986) (adjudicating a primary-stage case 
involving Connecticut’s law closing primaries to only member voters). 
 79. See Hancock, supra note 9, at 188. Of course, there may exist primary systems 
where members do not vote, such as where party leadership directly selects which 
candidates will be placed on the general election, forgoing the primary election all together. 
 80. MALCOLM E. JEWELL & DAVID M. OLSON, POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS IN 
AMERICAN STATES 104 (3d ed. 1988); see also PAUL ALLEN BECK & FRANK J. SORAUF, PARTY 
POLITICS IN AMERICA 249–50 (7th ed. 1992) (“[I]f . . . the primary was to replace the caucuses 
and conventions of the party organizations as nominators, the primary fails when it falls 
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(i.e.,  party-electorate) best preserves the purpose of holding direct 
primaries in the first place. 
Using these stages to more accurately define “the party” 
demonstrates a core principle: the component of a party tasked 
with exercising the party’s associational rights at the impacted 
stage best defines “the party.”81 For example, it is the party-
organization, not the party-electorate, that structures, funds, and 
coordinates the ballot access, endorsement, and convention stages. 
Party leaders are authorized to speak on behalf of the party and 
endorse a candidate, to allocate and direct the party’s finances, and 
to organize, run, and oversee the convention process. In the 
primary itself, however, the party-organization no longer wields 
the responsibility of acting on the party’s behalf. Instead, the 
members themselves vote and “select a standard bearer who best 
represents the party’s ideologies and preferences.”82 Moreover, 
defining “the party” by a component not exercising the party’s 
rights or authority at a given stage seems illogical: that component 
will rarely (if ever) feel any burden, as it has no authority to act on 
behalf of the party at the relevant stage. At best, this would make 
the Anderson-Burdick test obsolete as burdens would rarely be 
severe. Instead, defining “the party” by that component of the party 
which acts on behalf of the party as a whole during the impacted 
stage meets both the plaintiff-focused and rights/injury-focused 
nature of the Anderson-Burdick test. 
 
under the sway of those organizations. . . . The direct primary perhaps can be best thought 
of . . . as creating a veto body that passes on the work of party nominators . . . .”); Hancock, 
supra note 9, at 188 (“Because the government and organization have their associational 
rights emphasized and protected during the earlier steps in the process, such as the ballot 
access, endorsement, and convention stages, the primary should be considered the province 
of the electorate. Essentially, the primary is the only step in the process where the voters of 
the electorate can fully exercise their roles as party affiliates. In fact, the act of voting in a 
party’s primary can fairly be seen as one of the most significant acts of affiliation the electorate 
can accomplish.” (footnote omitted)). 
 81. This principle is similar to the point made earlier where some define “the party” 
by who is authorized to sue on behalf of the party. See supra Section IV.C, para. 4; see also 
supra note 62. While that definition was unsatisfactory because of its inflexibility, the 
principle proffered here allows courts to define “the party” in accordance with the relevant 
stage affected and who within the party acts on behalf of “the party” at that given stage. 
Thus, this principle affords the flexibility that different aspects of the party could be the focal 
point of a court’s burden measuring without creating a default rule that artificially binds 
courts from considering the actual rights at stake. 
 82. Jones, 530 U.S. at 575 (alteration omitted) (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. 
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224 (1989)). 
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D. The Plaintiff-Stage Framework 1.0 
The previous sections have focused on various questions a 
court can and should ask in defining the party: Who is the plaintiff? 
Which component of the party is suing? And, what stage of the 
nomination process does the election law affect (and thus which 
component of the party acts as “the party” writ large at that stage)? 
Together these questions create the Plaintiff-Stage framework 
summarized in the tables below. But as I mentioned above, this 
iteration is not without its deficiencies. These deficiencies and a 
final iteration of this framework are discussed in the next Part.  
 
PLAINTIFF-STAGE FRAMEWORK 1.0 
Step 1: Categorizing “the plaintiff” in election law cases 
 Burden Measured On 






(e.g., right to associate 




(e.g., right to associate 





(e.g., right to define 
membership, structure 
internal affairs,  
endorse candidates) 










 83.  As noted above, see supra note 46, courts often analyze the burden on a candidate 
in these types of cases. Often, however, the burden is also measured on voters because their 
rights to associate with any given candidate are usually implicated. 
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Step 2: Categorizing “the party” in election law cases 
 Party Definition (ergo Burden Measure) 
Step 2: What stage of 
the nomination process 
does the regulation 
affect? 





V. OVERCOMING DEFICIENCIES:  
THE PLAINTIFF-STAGE FRAMEWORK 2.0 
Despite the comprehensiveness of this framework, it still fails 
to resolve how the Tenth Circuit should have defined the Utah 
Republican Party in its recent decision. Applying the framework 
above, the court agreed that SB54’s burden should have been 
measured on the Party, but the court did not agree on which 
component of the Party the burden should have been measured. 
Applying the framework above, SB54 clearly does not regulate the 
endorsement, convention, or primary stages.84 SB54 does not affect 
endorsements because, as the Tenth Circuit majority correctly 
noted, “nothing in SB54 prevents the [Party] from endorsing the 
candidate of its choice and using traditional advertising channels 
to communicate that endorsement to the state’s voters.”85 Neither 
does SB54 burden the convention stage as the Party may still hold 
its caucuses and convention as it pleases.86 Finally, SB54 does 
 
 84. The ballot access stage is likewise not implicated, but because this is obvious, I 
have not mentioned it. 
 85. Utah Republican Party v. Cox, 885 F.3d 1219, 1219, 1232 (10th Cir. 2018). 
 86. Id. at 1225 (“If a party chooses to register as a [Qualified Political Party, as the Utah 
Republican Party did], however, it may still hold a caucus, and may certify the winners of the 
caucus to the primary ballot as before.”); see UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-9-403(3)(a) (West 2019). 
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nothing to restrict or open the primaries to various members of the 
electorate and thus does not impact the primary stage.87 
It could be argued that SB54 affects the ballot access stage as in 
the simplest terms it impacts how candidates access the ballots. But 
this too is not quite on point. The prototypical fact pattern for ballot 
access cases usually involves a minority party unable to place their 
candidates on the general election ballot because it failed to meet 
the ballot access thresholds.88 But these facts are incongruous with 
SB54’s effect on the Utah Republican Party. The Utah Republican 
Party is neither a minority party nor are its candidates unable to be 
placed on the ballot. Moreover, SB54 primarily targeted the Party’s 
primary election rather than the general election typically involved 
in prototypical ballot access cases. Most importantly, SB54 does not 
merely regulate who can be on an electoral ballot—it regulates how 
parties, like the Utah Republican Party, choose their standard 
bearers. In other words, categorizing SB54 as a ballot access law 
oversimplifies its impact on political parties. 
My schematic contribution would be of little value if the 
analysis stopped here. And so, continuing forward, the next Part 
addresses the two key deficiencies that make the Plaintiff-Stage 
framework incomplete: the current framework fails to identify (A) 
a broader stage of the nomination process and (B) an additional 
component of “the party” responsible at that stage. Remedying 
these deficiencies completes the Plaintiff-Stage framework and 
provides a clearer answer of how to deal with laws like SB54. 
A. Deficiency 1—Ignoring an Additional Nomination Stage:  
Procedure Creation 
While the Plaintiff-Stage framework accounts for laws affecting 
the individual steps of the nomination process, it does not account 
for laws, like SB54, that alter the process as a whole. For laws that 
change the individual steps of the nomination process, the Plaintiff-
Stage framework does provide an answer: laws changing who 
 
 87. Contra, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (a primary-stage 
case involving California’s law opening primaries to all voters whether affiliated with a party 
or not); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986) (a primary-stage case 
involving Connecticut’s law closing primaries to only member voters). 
 88.  See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
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participates in the primaries burden the party-electorate,89 and laws 
affecting how conventions are structured or who can be endorsed 
burden the party-organization.90 But what happens, however, 
when a law alters the nomination procedure as a whole, that is, the 
procedure by which candidates are selected? SB54, for example, 
does not affect which voters participate in primaries, who makes 
endorsements, or how the convention process is structured. 
Instead, it amends the nomination procedure itself by changing 
how candidates are selected. Thus, to complete the Plaintiff-Stage 
framework, we must recognize a nomination procedure creation stage 
to account for laws that impact the nomination procedure as a 
whole instead of the individual stages of that process. If nothing 
else, this stage must be recognized simply because laws affecting 
procedure are inextricably tied to substantive changes in expressive 
association—a point this Note discusses in more detail below.  
B. Deficiency 2—Ignoring an Additional Component of the Party: 
Party-Institution  
Even if the Plaintiff-Stage framework recognizes the 
nomination procedure creation stage, this does not answer how 
“the party” should be defined in these types of cases. Like above, 
we can look to who exercises authority over the nomination 
procedure creation stage to determine how the party should be 
defined. Put in other words, we must identify who determines the 
process by which candidates are nominated.91 However, none of 
 
 89. See supra note 87. 
 90. E.g., Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 229 (1989) (striking 
down law restricting how endorsements were made); Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin 
ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981) (striking down Wisconsin law binding party delegates 
to vote in a certain way, dissonant with national party self-selected rules). 
 91. Asking who determines how candidates are nominated is not the same as asking 
who determines who gets on the primary ballot. The answer to the latter question is one of 
the main justifications for the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Utah Republican Party: because the 
party-electorate could choose who they wanted to be on the primary ballot, the court decided 
that there was no severe burden on the party vis-à-vis its members. See Utah Republican Party, 
885 F.3d at 1232. However, the court did not address whether the State had the authority in 
the first place to determine that the party-electorate could determine which candidates were 
placed on the primary ballot. In other words, the Tenth Circuit reached their conclusion 
based in part on who was determining who got on the ballot. What that question should have 
been, and what this Note addresses, is who determines how candidates get on the ballot. Still 
in other words, this Note focuses on who has authority to determine the nomination process, 
not just on who is participating in that process. 
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the tripartite definitions of party—party-organization, party-
electorate, or party-government—adequately serve as a proper 
definition of “the party” in cases involving laws altering the overall 
nomination procedure. Thus, a second deficiency is that the 
Plaintiff-Stage framework needs to recognize a fourth definition of 
“the party” in these types of cases: the party-institution. 
1. The Party or the State?  
In defining who has the authority to determine a party’s 
nomination process, there are two options: the party or the state. 
Because states have constitutional and precedential authority to 
regulate elections, it could follow that states also have the authority 
to determine how candidates are placed on the general election 
ballot and, by continuation, on the primary ballot.92 As the Court 
noted in New York State Board of Elections v. Lopez Torres, while  
it may be “the party’s nominating process,” states have “a 
legitimate governmental interest in ensuring the fairness of . . .  
that process . . . .”93 
Accepting that the states hold this authority in totality, 
however, would give states unchecked power to determine how 
candidates were placed on the primary ballot. For starters, parties 
would likely have no cognizable claim against the state in these 
types of cases: if states possessed the complete rights to regulate the 
nomination procedure, parties would have no rights, and, thus, no 
claim that their self-selected procedures were burdened. Such an 
outcome, however, would be contrary to the relevant caselaw, 
which does not remotely suggest that parties have no standing in 
election law cases.94 
 
 92. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 4, cl. 1; Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 217 (“[T]he Constitution grants 
to the States a broad power to prescribe the ‘Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections 
for Senators and Representatives,’ which power is matched by state control over the election 
process for state offices.” (internal citation omitted)); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) 
(“[A]s a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to  
be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the  
democratic processes.”). 
 93. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 202–03 (2008). 
 94. See, e.g., Utah Republican Party v. Cox, 885 F.3d 1219, 1239 (10th Cir. 2018) 
(considering no other reason to dismiss the case for lack of standing or failing to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted); Alaskan Indep. Party v. Alaska, 545 F.3d 1173, 1175–76 
(9th Cir. 2008) (same). 
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Additionally, accepting this conclusion would violate the 
commonly accepted protection of “a political party’s decisions 
about the identity of, and the process for electing, its leaders.”95 Just 
because a state has “legitimate governmental interests” to 
“prescribe what [the nomination] process must be,”96 this does not 
mean the state has the sole decision-making authority to determine 
how candidates are placed on the primary ballot. In fact, in Eu, the 
Supreme Court simultaneously recognized that states have a 
legitimate government interest in ensuring fairness and that, “[a] 
political party has a First Amendment right . . . to choose a 
candidate-selection process that will in its view produce the 
nominee who best represents its political platform.”97 The 
Anderson-Burdick test provides for both of these considerations—
the state interests balanced against the party’s rights. And if state 
interests are already represented in the Anderson-Burdick test, that 
leaves the party with the right to determine the nomination 
procedure. After all, if states alone possessed the right to create 
nomination procedures, states would be limited only by their own 
interests when burdening political parties. In other words, there 
would be no limitations at all. Instead, the party, however we 
define it, holds the right to create nomination procedures. 
2. Which component of “the party”?  
With the party (not the state) having the right to determine how 
candidates are selected, we are again left with having to define “the 
party.” However, answering who has the authority to create these 
nomination procedures quickly becomes circular: Party members, 
party leaders, or both could determine these procedures. But 
whoever determines those procedures is likely already determined 
by preexisting party rules and bylaws. In an odd chicken-or-egg 
situation, rules determine who can set the rules. 
If, for simplicity’s sake, we were to define the party by its party 
leaders (i.e., party-organization), a court would, in cases like Utah 
Republican Party, only look at whether the party’s leaders were 
burdened by the state’s regulation. However, such an exclusive 
 
 95. Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 229 (1989) (emphasis added). 
 96. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. at 203. 
 97. Id. at 202–03. 
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focus on party leadership could give judges and scholars heartburn, 
as it entirely removes lay party members from the initial 
nominating procedure creation.98 Of course, we could use party 
members, or both members and leaders, to define “the party” in 
these cases, but, at any rate, this is simply an arbitrary decision that 
may or may not reflect how a specific party functions. Moreover,  
if, as discussed above, the party-electorate and the party-
organization are at odds with each other, there would be no way to 
clarify how to define a party. Perhaps we could define “the party” 
by each party’s self-selected body that is in charge of creating  
the bylaws and procedures, but this still creates the same  
chicken-or-egg problem. 
Though political scientist V. O. Key’s tripartite (party-
organization, party-electorate, and party-government) certainly 
describes many components of “the party,” there is no clear 
component of the party responsible for the creation of nomination 
procedures in every situation. However, identifying a fourth 
component of “the party” can remedy this issue. Even though 
identifying who exercises the authority to create a party’s 
nomination procedures, bylaws, and rules is unclear, the party’s 
self-selected nomination process is clear. These party bylaws, 
procedures, and rules comprise the fourth, albeit inanimate, 
component of political parties: the party-institution. While the 
party-organization includes leaders, delegates, and party 
workers,99 neither the party-organization, party-government, nor 
party-electorate account for a party’s bylaws, procedures, customs, 
or constitution. In contrast, the party-institution is comprised of 
exclusively these institutional elements of the party. 
 
 98. See, e.g., id. at 205 (“To be sure, we have . . . permitted States to set their faces 
against ‘party bosses’ by requiring party-candidate selection through processes more 
favorable to insurgents, such as primaries.”); Utah Republican Party, 885 F.3d at 1234 (“[The 
language in Lopez Torres] establishes that the associational rights of a political party expand 
beyond the party leadership, and would be toothless if party bosses could dictate how 
candidates can qualify for the primary ballot, perhaps, for example, by requiring candidates 
to win the support of ‘party bosses’ in order to qualify for the primary ballot, leading to 
primary ‘elections’ with a single candidate on the ballot.” (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Alaskan Indep. Party, 545 F.3d at 1177 (upholding an Alaskan law 
because it “remove[d] party nominating decisions from the infamous ‘smoke-filled rooms’ 
and place[d] them instead in the hands of a party’s rank-and-file . . .”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 99. KEY, supra note 9. 
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For example, the Utah Republican Party has structured its 
procedures such that a candidate can be nominated only through 
the caucus-convention system: if a candidate receives over 60% of 
the convention vote, that candidate is placed directly on the general 
election ballot without participating in the primary election.100 If, 
however, no candidate gains 60% of the convention vote, the top 
two candidates participate in a state-run primary.101 No doubt, 
SB54 severely infringes on the Party’s self-selected bylaws and 
procedures themselves as the State gives candidates safe passage to 
circumvent those bylaws and procedures and be nominated in 
another way.102 
Additionally, precedent supports recognizing this additional 
component of the party: In Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic 
Central Committee, for example, the Court stated that “freedom of 
association also encompasses a political party’s decisions about 
the . . . process for electing[] its leaders.”103 Those constitutionally 
protected decisions are the procedures and bylaws that the party 
itself selects. In Tashjian, the Court reaffirmed this principle by 
stating that a “Party’s determination of . . . the structure which best 
allows it to pursue its political goals, is protected by the 
Constitution.”104 Again, “the structure[,]” or institutional 
procedures of the party, “is protected by the Constitution.”105 
Several benefits arise from using this additional definition of 
“the party” in cases, like Utah Republican Party, where the state law 
directly burdens the party’s choice of its nomination process. First, 
focusing on a party’s self-selected procedures is supported by and 
explains apparent discrepancies between leading Supreme Court 
precedent. In Jones, the Court held that a state could not force a 
party to include unaffiliated voters in the party’s primary.106 
Contrastingly, in Tashjian the Court also held that a state could not 
force a party to exclude unaffiliated voters in the party’s primary.107 
While the cases seem to contradict each other, they can be 
 
 100. Utah Republican Party, 885 F.3d at 1224. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See id. at 1263–64. 
 103. Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 229 (1989) (emphasis added). 
 104. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 224 (1986). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 567–68 (2000). 
 107. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 208–09. 
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reconciled if, instead of asking only who was allowed to vote in a 
party’s primary, we ask how the nomination process was structured 
prior to a state’s regulation. In Jones, the California Democratic 
Party, according to its bylaws, only allowed voters affiliated with 
the party to participate in its primary election; yet the California 
law contradicted the Democratic Party’s self-selected procedure by 
forcing an open primary and was thus ruled unconstitutional.108 In 
Tashjian, the Connecticut Republican Party adopted a rule 
permitting unaffiliated, independent voters to vote in the party’s 
primary; yet the Connecticut law forced a closed primary, and was 
thus ruled unconstitutional as well.109 In both cases, the Court 
ultimately gave considerable weight to the party’s self-selected 
procedures: in Jones, the party’s self-selected rules were to keep 
unaffiliated voters out, and in Tashjian they were to allow 
unaffiliated voters in.110 
Second, using a party-institution definition massively 
simplifies a court’s task of defining “the party,” avoiding the 
chicken-or-egg problem described above. Because a court is looking 
only at how severely a law burdens a party’s structure and 
nomination procedures, it is not wrapped up in trying to determine 
which traditional part of the party—be it party-organization or 
party-electorate—is acting on behalf of the party and thus bears the 
burden of the law at the nomination process creation stage. Rather, 
defining “the party” by its institutional and procedural existence 
allows a court to side-step this hairy categorization game altogether 
at this stage.111 
 
 108. Jones, 530 U.S. at 570 (“Until 1996 [when the law in question was enacted], to 
determine the nominees of qualified parties California held what is known as a ‘closed’ 
partisan primary, in which only persons who are members of the political party—i. e., who 
have declared affiliation with that party when they register to vote—can vote on its 
nominee[.]” (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 109. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 208. 
 110. Note that this principle of focusing on an expressive association’s self-selected 
rules and procedures is not unique to election law jurisprudence. For example, in Boy Scouts 
of America v. Dale, the Court respected the Boy Scout’s “official position” not to associate with 
homosexuals. 530 U.S. 640, 655 (2000) (“The Boy Scouts takes an official position with respect 
to homosexual conduct, and that is sufficient for First Amendment purposes.”). 
 111. While this Note focuses on laws that affect the entire nomination process itself, 
party-institution could be used to define “the party” in cases where election laws burden how 
a specific stage is structured. For example, how a primary is conducted (as opposed to who 
is able to participate in it) or how endorsements are made (as opposed to who can endorse 
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A third benefit in using a party-institution definition is that it 
ensures that the entire purpose of political party First Amendment 
association is realized, which is the “collective expression and 
propagation of shared [political] ideals.”112 When freedom of 
association was first recognized, the Court noted that “[e]ffective 
advocacy of both public and private points of view . . . is undeniably 
enhanced by group association . . . .”113 In differentiating between 
the various types of association, the Court identified both intrinsic 
or intimate associations, or associations designed to 
“maintain . . . human relationships,” and instrumental associations, 
or associations designed to engage in “speech, assembly, [and] 
petition . . . .”114 Thus, instrumental associations like political 
parties have First Amendment rights for truly one purpose: to 
“express[] and propagat[e]” political ideals. 
Most certainly, the actual expressions and propagations of 
expressive associations are also protected under the First 
Amendment—a court would find no constitutional concerns with 
protecting a party’s actual endorsement, for example, within 
certain constitutional constraints.115 But the First Amendment does 
not protect only a party’s candidate endorsement. As the Supreme 
Court noted in Jones, “[u]nsurprisingly, our cases vigorously affirm 
the special place the First Amendment reserves for, and the special 
protection it accords, the process by which a political party select[s] 
a standard bearer who best represents the party’s ideologies and 
 
or be endorsed). The case law seems to suggest that use of party-institution in specific 
nomination stage cases is not far from the mark. In endorsement cases, for example, if a state 
were to somehow limit the endorsement capabilities of a party, see, e.g., Eu v. S.F. Cty. 
Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 229 (1989), a court could look at how severely the 
state law burdened the party-institution, i.e., how severely the state law infringed on what 
the party itself chose as its endorsement process. Similarly, in convention cases, a court could 
look to how severely a state law impacted a party’s self-selected way of organizing its 
convention. In many ways, when a court is measuring “the party” by the party-organization 
in these cases, it is very likely that what drives a court’s conclusion is not how severely  
did the law burden the party’s leaders’ ability to endorse a candidate, but rather how  
much does the law disable party leaders from following the party’s self-selected  
endorsement procedures. 
 112. Dimino, supra note 11, at 75 (quoting Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church 
& Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 200 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (alteration in original)). 
 113. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). 
 114. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–18 (1984). 
 115. See generally, e.g., Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989) 
(striking down a law as violative of the First Amendment as it limited political parties’ ability 
to endorse candidates at the primary stage). 
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preferences.”116 Thus, the Court reaffirmed that the Constitution 
protects both a party’s choice and its process in choosing a  
standard bearer. 
Why such a focus on process and ensuring that a party’s 
institutional procedures are protected? The dissent in Utah 
Republican Party explains it perfectly:  
American legal thought is famed for its focus on procedure. And 
there is good reason: as every first-year civil procedure student 
learns, substance and procedure frequently form a Gordian 
knot—impossible to disentangle. . . . One change to procedure 
can work a profound change to the substance of political parties, 
including which candidates they choose and what messages they 
communicate.117  
In more simple terms, the Constitution protects not only the 
expression itself, but also the process by which that expression  
is created. 
C. The Plaintiff-Stage Framework 2.0  
While my initial iteration of the Plaintiff-Stage framework 
failed to adequately provide for cases like Utah Republican Party and 
SB54, a second iteration remedies these deficiencies by 
incorporating both the nomination procedure creation stage and 
the party-institution component of “the party.” A summary is 












 116. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 575 (2000) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Eu, 489 U.S. at 224) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 117. Utah Republican Party v. Cox, 885 F.3d 1219, 1246 (10th Cir. 2018) (Tymkovich, 
C.J., concurring in part), revised and superseded by 892 F.3d 1066 (10th Cir. 2018). 
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PLAINTIFF-STAGE FRAMEWORK (2.0) 
Step 1: Categorizing “the plaintiff” in election law cases 
 Burden Measured On 






(e.g., right to associate 




(e.g., right to associate 





(e.g., right to define 
membership, structure 
internal affairs,  
endorse candidates) 
(see Step 2) 
 
 
Step 2: Categorizing “the party” in election law cases 
 Party Definition (ergo Burden Measure) 
Step 2: What stage of 
the nomination 
process does the 
regulation affect? 







VI. NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS:  
WHAT SHOULD THE ROLE OF PARTIES BE? 
Even using the objective framework suggested in this Note, 
how a judge normatively views the role of parties in our democratic 
system could affect how he or she ultimately defines and measures 
 
 118. As noted above, courts often analyze the burden on a candidate in these types of 
cases. See supra note 46. Often, however, the burden is also measured on voters because their 
rights to associate with any given candidate are usually implicated. 
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a burden. I mention it here not because a court should engage in 
this subjective reasoning, but because ignoring this possibility 
would be unwise. As Professor Elizabeth Garret noted, “to decide 
political party cases, judges are very likely to rely on their own 
views of the best governance structures for a stable democracy.”119 
Of course, if judges approached cases with their own subjective 
viewpoints, our legal system would fail to provide consistency and 
notice to both states and regulated political parties. In general, a 
judge may engage in two main normative considerations: (1) 
whether political parties are private actors or state actors, and (2) 
what the preferred hierarchies of power are within a party itself. 
While the state-actor question primarily influences how judges 
measure the severity of the burden and a state’s interests (later 
considerations of the Anderson-Burdick test not covered here), the 
Plaintiff-Stage framework helps objectify both considerations, 
especially providing a formulaic approach to answering the party-
hierarchy question. 
A. The State-Actor Question 
The public or private nature of political parties influences the 
level of protection provided by the First Amendment. For example, 
if parties and their primaries were considered purely private 
matters, “then parties could effectively exclude racial minorities 
from the political process.”120 In the White Primary Cases, however, 
the courts consistently struck down every attempt of the Texas 
Democratic Party to exclude African Americans in its party 
primaries.121 These cases demonstrate that political parties do have 
constitutional limits, suggesting they are at least not purely  
private actors.122 
This has led some scholars to conclude that because “parties 
play a central role in the electoral process through their power to 
nominate candidates,” parties are state actors, constitutionally 
 
 119. Garrett, supra note 4, at 131. 
 120. MICHAEL DIMINO ET AL., VOTING RIGHTS AND ELECTION LAW 445 (2010). 
 121. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 462–63, 470 (1953); see also TOKAJI, supra note 
41, at 245 (noting that the White Primary Cases provide an example of how political parties 
have constitutional obligations, making them not purely private). 
 122. See supra note 120. 
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limited in their autonomy.123 But this extreme view yields 
unsatisfying results. If parties were purely state actors, a party 
would be unable to raise First Amendment claims when a state 
regulated its associational freedoms—a party could not choose its 
members, its leaders, or, most alarmingly, have “standing to sue 
the government . . . for any imposition whatsoever” as it would be 
the equivalent of the state suing itself.124 
With neither extreme satisfactory, most scholars and courts 
have settled into the hazy middle ground: “Parties thus occupy a 
distinctive position in the U.S. system of government. They are 
neither completely private nor completely public entities, and they 
have constitutional obligations as well as constitutional rights.”125 
Adding to the complexity of defining the party as something 
between a state actor and private actor is “the familiar law review 
refrain, it depends.”126 The Plaintiff-Stage framework comports 
with the majority of judges and scholars: political parties are 
somewhere between purely public and purely private. If anything, 
however, this question is best answered with the Anderson-Burdick 
test: as a party’s activities become more public in nature (i.e., 
involving more of the party-electorate), states have a greater 
interest in regulating those party activities. The White Primary Cases 
provide some example of this: because the parties were 
participating in primaries, which themselves directly influenced 
who could vote and how “public issues are decided or public 
officials selected,” parties could not restrict their membership 
based on race.127 The Texas Democratic Party had “become an 
 
 123. Dimino, supra note 11, at 65–66. 
 124. Persily & Cain, supra note 4, at 777–78. 
 125. TOKAJI, supra note 41, at 245; see also Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 
572–73 (2000) (“[W]e have not held . . . that the processes by which political parties select 
their nominees are . . . wholly public affairs that States may regulate freely.”). 
 126. Persily & Cain, supra note 4, at 777–78 (“As most recognize, this sticky state actor 
question is probably best answered by some categorization of parties as state actor hybrids, 
or . . . by the familiar law review refrain, it depends.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
For more scholarship on the state-actor question, see generally Dimino, supra note 11. Dimino 
provides a thorough overview of the state-actor question and then advocates for a new 
system in which parties would be completely autonomous organizations (not state– or 
hybrid-actors) and that the State could then offer benefits (such as participation in a state-
funded primary) based on certain conditions. So long as those conditions were 
constitutional, states would not violate a party’s First Amendment associational rights. 
Dimino, supra note 11. 
 127. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 465–69 (1953). 
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integral part . . . of the elective process that determines who shall 
rule and govern in the county.”128 Ultimately, however, as this Note 
is focused on the first prong of the Anderson-Burdick test and as the 
state-actor question is more related to the later prongs, further 
analysis on this question is left for another day. 
B. The Party-Hierarchy Question 
As discussed below, parties are comprised of various groups 
that function in different capacities and at different times. 
Recognizing these different components of political parties, 
Professors Persily and Cain created five paradigms that 
normatively order how power should be allocated within parties: 
the Managerial, Libertarian, Progressive, Political Markets, and 
Pluralist Paradigms.129 Each of the Persily-Cain paradigms begins 
with different views on the primary purpose of political parties. 
These purposes then determine how many political parties our 
system should have, where power should be centered in a party, 
what interests, if any, the state has in regulating the party system, 
and what role, if any, the judiciary should have.130 
If, for example, a judge thinks the primary purpose of parties is 
to express the political opinions of their members—a view referred 
to as the Libertarian Paradigm—that judge may be indifferent to 
the number of political parties in the system, but she will give 
deference to the party’s formal organization over the lay party 
members, strongly encourage states to stay out of party affairs, and 
view herself as an interventionist seeking to preserve the ballot box 
as a public forum.131 If, on the other hand, a judge ascribes to the 
Progressive, Political Markets, or Critical Paradigms, that judge 
will nearly always measure a law’s burden on the electorate, as the 
electorate is the top of the paradigm’s preferred power hierarchy 
within political parties. Similarly, judges ascribing to the 
Libertarian or Pluralist Paradigms will scrutinize any burdens on 
the party organization, as judges holding these views consider the 
organization itself to be the center of party power.132 
 
 128. Id. at 469. 
 129. See generally Persily & Cain, supra note 4. 
 130. See generally id. 
 131. Id. at 782–85, 791–96. 
 132. For more on the Persily-Cain paradigms, see id. 
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The relevance of these paradigms is clear: Suppose a regulation 
severely burdens a party’s institution, organization, or leadership, 
but places no burden on party members (as was the case with SB54). 
If a judge views lay party members as the first seat of party power, 
that judge will not find the regulation severely burdensome.  
If, however, the judge considers other components of the party to 
hold the first seat of party power, the judge would consider the 
regulation a severe burden. As discussed above,133 the majority  
and dissent in Utah Republican Party aptly demonstrated  
this dichotomy.134 
The challenge with these paradigms, however, is that the 
outcome of a case would depend on the opinions of the sitting 
judge—an approach that fosters neither consistency nor adequate 
notice to states or political parties. The Plaintiff-Stage framework 
removes this subjectivity by objectively defining which component 
of the party should be considered the center of party power at each 
stage of the election process. With this framework, regardless of a 
judge’s particular views, courts can consistently define and 
measure burdens on political parties at any stage of an election. All 
in all, the Plaintiff-Stage framework also removes many of the 
subjective considerations that may inform a judge’s ruling in these 
types of cases. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Despite the importance of political parties in our modern 
democratic system, case law and scholarship provide no clear 
framework for accurately defining political parties. Yet how a court 
defines a political party is most certainly decisive.135 If nothing else, 
 
 133. See generally supra Part II. 
 134. The majority frequently cited language from the case law and reasoned that a law 
burdening the leadership, but not the lay party members, would not be a severe burden: “[I]f 
the URP wants to open its doors to roughly 600,000 people across the state of Utah, the 
associational rights of the party are not severely burdened when the will of those voters might 
reflect a different choice than would be made by the party leadership,” especially since 
“States [are permitted] to set their faces against ‘party bosses’ . . . .” Utah Republican Party 
v. Cox, 885 F.3d 1219, 1233–34 (10th Cir. 2018). Here, the majority was identifying their 
preferred power hierarchy within the party: first, lay members, and somewhere after that, 
leadership. See id. See generally supra Part II. 
 135. Persily, supra note 58, at 2185–86 (“Because a primary election represents the 
opportunity for the party to express itself by rallying behind a candidate . . . a court’s ex ante 
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the Tenth Circuit’s recent definition of the Utah Republican Party 
demonstrates this: by defining “the party” as the party-electorate, 
the court concluded that SB54 placed only a minimal burden, if any, 
on the party.136 But, the dissent, defining “the party” by its 
institutional procedures and bylaws, found SB54 to severely 
burden the Party’s associational rights. To help remedy this 
definitional dispute among judges, I have suggested an objective 
and schematic approach to accurately define political parties: the 
Plaintiff-Stage framework. For in accurately defining “the party,” a 
court will know on whom to measure the burden of an election 
regulation. And by accurately measuring these burdens, a court 
will more accurately determine the severity of such burdens. 
To summarize, the Plaintiff-Stage framework instructs judges 
on how to define “the party” in the various election law cases they 
may face. Obviously, the plaintiff matters. When voters or 
candidates are suing, defining “the party” is irrelevant—the 
burden is simply measured on the voters or candidates, 
respectively. Even when a political party is a plaintiff (oftentimes 
bringing suit in conjunction with voters or candidates), the party 
may be asserting the rights of voters or candidates and not its own. 
In these cases, defining “the party” is also irrelevant: alleging 
infringements of voter or candidate rights directs a court to 
measure any burdens on those rights-holders. But following the 
Anderson-Burdick framework, if the plaintiff is a political party and 
asserts that its rights as a party have been violated, a court must 
attempt to define “the party.” Because a political party is a 
multifaceted group with different components that each act on 
behalf of the party at different stages of the nomination process, a 
court must identify which stage is affected by the regulation. In 
cases where a law affects either the convention or endorsement 
stages, “the party” is most appropriately defined by the party-
organization, and any burdens should be measured on that 
component of the party. When a law affects the primary stage, “the 
 
determination as to which component of the party can speak for it in litigation can have the 
effect of determining the content of the party’s expression in the primary.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 136. See Utah Republican Party v. Cox, 885 F.3d 1219, 1235 (10th Cir.), revised and 
superseded by 892 F.3d 1066 (10th Cir. 2018). 
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party” is most appropriately defined by the party-electorate, and 
any burdens should be measured on that component of the party. 
But, in cases where a law affects procedure itself—how the 
candidates are selected and nominated in general, that is, the 
nomination procedure creation stage as it was described above—
“the party” is best defined by the party-institution (i.e., its bylaws, 
rules, and procedures). Not only does this definition more 
accurately reflect the true burden of the state’s regulation when it 
affects procedure, but it also comports with a long line of precedent 
zealously protecting procedure due to its effect on substance. Of 
course, simply defining “the party” by its institutional bylaws and 
procedures does not remove a court’s challenging inquiry into 
what constitutes a “severe” burden or, even more challenging, 
what state interests justify such a burden. But these topics are left 
for another day. 
From this country’s founding, associations of like-minded 
people have shaped the social and political landscape. It was a 
simple principle—“[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private 
points of view . . . is undeniably enhanced by group association”—
that led the United States Supreme Court in 1958 to reaffirm an 
individual’s “freedom to engage in association for the advancement 
of beliefs and ideas” as an “inseparable aspect” of liberty.137 And it 
is paramount that courts accurately define political parties—
groups created for the sole purpose of engaging in expressive 
association—so that any burdens placed upon their associational 
rights can be measured accurately. Without this accurate 
measurement, however, courts will make the same mistake the 
Tenth Circuit did in Utah Republican Party, where a state law that 
circumvented a political party’s self-selected procedure for 
determining its own standard-bearer was found to impose no 
burden on the party’s associational rights. By applying the 
completed Plaintiff-Stage framework, courts will avoid making 




 137. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). 
 *   J.D., 2020, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 
